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Who will Speak for the Pasmandaa Women? —Dalits, Women, Muslims, and the Politics of
Representation
By Rafia Kazim 1
Abstract
This article questions the deliberate omissions of disadvantaged Dalit Muslim women, also
known as Pasmandaa women, from feminist, Dalit, and subaltern discourses. To understand the
multiplicative nature of oppression and discrimination that these women are continually subjected
to, this article foregrounds the intersectionality framework to get a nuanced picture of intersecting
vertices of discrimination. It argues that by excluding these severely disadvantaged women from
their respective agenda, feminist and Dalit activists have contributed towards their perpetual
marginality. Underlying such unaccounted absence of these women is an insouciant attitude of the
Pasmandaa leaders towards them. Their approach towards non-representation of their women and
their specific concerns raises questions about the very efficacy of the Pasmandaa movement. This
article has tried to seek answers to such questions by directly interrogating women of these
communities through an exploratory study. Data for this article was gathered by intensive
interviews of women from the community. The article draws on data from a larger ongoing study
of these women in the states of UP and Bihar.
Keywords: Pasmandaa women, Dalit Muslims, Intersectionality, Representational politics,
Ashraafization, Arzaals.
Introduction
‘Pasmandaa’ is a Persian word that refers to those who lag and are backward. Though the
category 'Pasmandaa Muslims' refers to the most downtrodden groups who indulge in demeaning
and menial occupations such as cleaners, scavengers, butchers, bangle sellers, washer men,
vegetable vendors, fishermen, potters, blacksmith, and weavers, this category is fluid and
accommodates even those castes, which are considered relatively well off. In the 1990s, when all
of India was protesting the Mandal Commission 2 recommendations, Dalit Muslims, with the
1
Dr. Rafia Kazim is an Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, LNM University. She was earlier associated
with CSD, Hyderabad, and was a Senior Lecturer at SC College, Osmania University, Hyderabad, India. She has
publications in international and national peer-reviewed journals and is the author of a book on linguistic prejudices:
Learning the Infidels’ Language: Muslim Women and the English Language (2020). Her areas of interest are gender
and language, multilingual education, early childhood education subaltern groups, and legal pluralism. Email:
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2
On 1st January 1979, the Indian Government under Prime Minister Moraraji Desai formed a committee on the
socially and educationally backward classes (OBCs) of India. It was headed by BP Mandal-an Indian parliamentarianwith the key objective of ameliorating the socio-economic situation of backward castes through reservations in various
sectors of employment, especially in government jobs. The Committee recommended that these OBCs that constituted
52% of India's total population should be granted reservations to 27% of jobs in the Central government and public
sector undertakings. However, it was only after a decade (in the 1990s) that the intent to implement the Mandal
Commission recommendations was declared by the then Prime Minister, VP Singh, to which most upper-caste
students objected and led to some violent protests across India against the Mandal Commission recommendations.
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intention of making their presence felt in the political arena, formed organizations to highlight
their plight. Thus, in the tumultuous decade of the 1990s, we witnessed the rise of Dalit Muslims’
organizations such as Eijaz Ali’s All India United Muslim Morcha (1993) and Ali Anwar’s the All
India Muslim Mahaz (1998). What is interesting about the latter is the use of the term ‘Pasmandaa’
as the rubric under which it intended to accommodate all the Dalit Muslims. Pasmandaa, a word
with Persian etymology, means the fallen one or the backward. The politics behind choosing a
word of Persio-Arabic roots could have been a) to provide an ethnic-racial legitimacy to the Dalit
Muslims by subtly hinting at their distinctiveness from the Hindu Dalits and/or, b) the use of the
Persian word instead of the colloquial word reflects their latent desire to be associated with the
Ashraafs 3 , i.e., a longing for Ashraafization. Ali Anwar and other activists from the Muslim
backward caste communities realized that if they wanted to ameliorate the sordid plight of the
backward caste Muslims, they would have to fight for their rights of their caste identity and not on
their religious identity alone. They were also aware of the discriminatory politics of the Ashraaf
Muslims who deliberately distanced themselves from the wretchedness of the backward Muslims.
These advocates of the Pasmandaa movement 4 felt the urgent need to choose representatives from
within their caste who could fight exclusively for backward Muslims’ rights. However, the
founders of the Pasmandaa movement failed to give due representation to the problems of women
of their community that are so distinct from those of the Pasmandaa men and upper-caste Muslim
women.
It is at the background of this that the study questions the deliberate omissions of the
disadvantaged women from the feminist, Dalit, and subaltern discourses. To understand the
multiplicative nature of oppression and discrimination that these women are continually subjected
to this study foregrounds the intersectionality framework to get a nuanced picture of intersecting
vertices of discrimination. It argues that by excluding these women from their respective agenda,
feminist and Dalit activists have contributed towards their perpetual marginality.
Underlying such unaccounted absence of women of their community is an insouciant
attitude of the Pasmandaa leaders towards their women. Their approach towards the nonrepresentation of these women and their specific concerns raises questions about the very efficacy
of the Pasmandaa movement. This study has tried to seek answers to such questions by directly
engaging with the women of their community. Given the exploratory nature of this study, data for
this article were gathered through intensive interviews of these women. The paper draws on data
from a larger ongoing study on these disadvantaged women mostly from the states of Uttar Pradesh
and Bihar, India.
Caste-like Formations among Indian Muslims
Insofar as documentation of caste among Muslims is concerned, Imtiaz Ahmad’s edited
volume Caste and Social Stratification among Muslims in India. (1978) provides a cogent
description of caste-like formations existing among Muslims across India.The volume provides
valuable accounts of the anomalies existing between the ideal/textual and the real/experiential in
the context of Islamic praxis. However, before this volume, the main account was Ghaus Ansari’s
Ashrafs are the upper caste Muslims such as Sayyads, Sheikhs, Mughals, and Pathans.
The movement started by the most backward Muslims is known as the Pasmandaa movement in the decades of the
1990s in the northern states of India, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar. The movement challenges the myth that the Muslim
community is a monolithic community premised on the Islamic concept of egalitarianism, and lays bare the internal
differentiation within the Muslim community in India.
3
4
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work on caste among Muslims in Uttar Pradesh, published in the 1960s. Subsequently, Imtiaz
Amhad’s seminal work, ‘The Ashraaf and Ajlaaf Categories in Indo-Muslim Society’ (1967), on
the efficacy of the distinction between the Ashraaf and Ajlaaf categories highlighted the
ambiguities associated with these two categories. He found that the categories of Ashraf and Ajlaf
in most parts of India were not sufficient as there were other region-specific categories and
subcategories that reflected the internal distinctions within the Muslim communities of that
particular region, i.e., distinctions based on the sects of Shia and Sunni. For instance, in most parts
of Western and Southern India, sectarian categories such as the Ismailis, Sulaimanis, Khojas,
Bhohras, etc. reflect the internal distinctions within the Muslim community more prominently than
the caste categories. Additionally, across India there are several caste-like distinctions that do not
fall within these two categories of Ashraafs and Ajlaaf.
However, the extant literature on caste among Muslims in India refers only to the Ashraaf
and the Ajlaaf castes. What distinguishes the Hindu caste system from that of Muslim caste-like
formations is the fact that the latter is based on ethnic origin and descent of people. Imtiaz Ahmad
(1967) observes:
‘The Ashraaf or the Upper class include all undoubted descendants of foreign
Muslims (Arabs, Persians, and Afghans, etc.) and converts from the upper castes of
Hindus. Like the higher Hindu castes,they consider it degrading to engage in menial
occupations or to handle the plough, and they look down upon all other Muslims
whom they call ‘Ajlaaf’ (ibid: 887).
The Ajlaafs are mostly the functional and service castes such as the weavers, barbers,
washermen, tailors, etc. More recently, the third category of Arjaals is also added which includes
castes that indulge in supposedly unclean jobs such as tannery, butchery, sanitation, shoe making,
etc.
Hierarchical Distinctions within Muslim Castes
Thus, castes within the Muslim community broadly categorize Muslims under three
hierarchical rubrics: Ashraaf, Ajlaaf, and Arzaals (Ansari 1960, Ahmad 1967 & 1978, Singh 1994,
GOI 2006). However, even among the Ashraafs, there are internal distinctions too. The Ashraafs
comprise four groups of Sayyads, Sheikhs, Mughal, and Pathans. While the Sayyads claim
themselves to be the direct descendants from the Prophet’s line (hence purest of all other Muslims)
the Sheikhs claim to descend from the Muslim nobility of various ethnic groups that came from
Central Asia. The Sayyads are the Muslim parallel of the Brahmins. They, like their Brahmin
counterparts, are mostly concerned with learning and administration. The Sheikhs too claim their
descent from the nobility that settled in India from Central and West Asia. Likewise, the Mughals
and the Pathans, as the names suggest, came from elsewhere (mostly from Iran and Afghanistan).
They are mainly warrior groups and correspond to the Kshatriya of the Hindu community. By
contrast, the Ajlaafs are those who converted to Islam long ago, and who, unlike the Ashraaf,
primarily happen to be members of the indigenous population. They are mostly artisan groups like
carpenters, ironsmith, etc., associated with clean occupations. The third category is that of the
Arzaals, again believed to be converted from the autochthonous Dalit caste of the Hindu
community and who more recently rechristened themselves as the Pasmandaas.
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The Orientalist ethnocentric undertone of the Ashraafs becomes evident when they take
pride in the fact that they came from the foreign lands to the west of India, i.e., from the Occident.
It is this undercurrent of ethnocentrism that becomes a pertinent criterion of their identity which
they flauntingly use to differentiate themselves from the Ajlaafs and the Arzaals. There is some
sort of sanctity that is attached to the purity of descent that makes it essential for the Ashraafs to
maintain the ritual purity of blood through strict adherence to endogamous rules (Ahmad 1978).
Thus, even though caste rules among Indian Muslims may not be as stringent as those among the
Hindus, especially when it comes to the concept of pollution and purity, Muslim castes normally
try not to dilute the rules of endogamy. It is through the mechanism of endogamy that inter-caste
hierarchy is maintained even among Muslims. However, those castes which are associated with
scavenging, tannery, butchery, midwifery, and other allied activities, reportedly face
discrimination even in mosques and graveyards where they are denied entry to these places for
their association with ‘unclean’ occupations. But these kinds of discriminations do not reflect or
indicate any possibility of pollution through touch or shadow as is witnessed in the Hindu uppercaste groups. In fact, such social distancing is practiced not on the lines of ritual purity and
pollution but with the intention of maintaining the cultural distinctiveness of the Ashraafs.
Such is the concern of the Ashraafs in maintaining their cultural distinctiveness from the
Ajlaafs and Arzaals that they are derogatorily referred to as badzaat (bad caste) or kamzaat (low
caste) in the popular discourse. Even in mainstream Urdu literature, authors like Ismat Chughtai
address the Pasmandaas as kunjrde (vegetable sellers), kasais (butchers) (Kazim 2008). Any
deviant behavior within the Ashraaf microcosm is derogatorily labeled as bakhkho-bakhain (the
vagabond-beggars caste) or resembling that of kunjrde-kasais’s, i.e., lowly and bereft of any
genteel mannerisms. By prioritizing their cultural distinctiveness, the Ashraafs ensured that the
social cleavage within the Muslim community was maintained through endogamy. During
interviews, one of the participants recounted her colleague’s (Ashraaf Muslim) marriage to a
Brahmin and the reaction of her relatives. The relatives would have objected more had she married
a Muslim low caste instead of marrying a Hindu Brahmin. Such is the abhorrence of the Ashraafs
with the Ajlaafs and Arzaals. In fact, an Ajlaaf would have reacted in much the same way had a
member of his community forged a marital alliance with the Arzaals.
Thus, these earlier works on caste among Muslims in India have been significant in refuting
the belief that Muslims adhere to the core concept of the egalitarianism of Islam. The concept of
egalitarianism in Islam is challenged, even within the Muslim community, by the irrefragability of
caste-based discriminations that become obvious in the practices of endogamy and connubiality.
The subtleties of discriminatory practices may, to some extent, camouflage the social
crevices among Indian Muslim communities at large, but the fact of the matter is that such practices
become overtly visible in the domains of marriage and social dining. The Pasmandaas in general
face two problems: i) the Ashraaf group is reluctant to admit to their discriminatory approach
towards the Pasmandaas which further complicates the chances of them getting the same benefits
that the Hindu Dalits are entitled to, and- ii) Pasmandaas remain the most backward on multiple
indices of social, economic, and educational development, even within the already
disadvantageous Muslim minority community. Owing to the social ostracism that they are
subjected to at the hands of the Ashraaf Muslims, the non-Ashraaf groups (mostly belonging to
the Arzaal community) decided to spearhead a movement that would be solely for and by the Dalit
Muslims.
Whereas the term Dalit means oppressed and is aptly self-explanatory, the term
Pasmandaa, by contrast, betrays the very oppressive practices that the lower caste Muslims were
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subjected to, even though in their case, the degree of oppression was milder than that to which
Dalits were subjected to within the Hindu caste structure. More recently, there have been scores
of articles on Pasmandaa Muslims who, in their quest for benefitting from caste-based reservation
policies, have spearheaded their political activism by demanding Scheduled Caste (SC) 5, a status
that is otherwise confined only to the Hindu Dalits.
The Pasmandaa movement was initiated by men, and there was barely any involvement of
women in this movement. It focused mostly on pressurizing the state to identify them also, just
like their Hindu counterparts, as 'Scheduled Caste' and not as Other Backward Caste (Article 341
of the Constitution of India). The benefits associated with SC are numerous; for instance,
reservations in government jobs, age relaxation for the same, stricter laws against any instance of
oppression against them, and other social welfare policies sponsored by the state for SC/ST under
protective discrimination policies. These benefits are seen as compensation for centuries of
oppression and discrimination that Hindu SCs were subjected to by the High caste Hindus. The
Pasmandaa political leaders resented the denial of similar identification and the benefits thereupon
accruing from such identification. The identity politics obliterated the other more pressing issues
of which they lost sight of-such as the empowerment of women through modern education,
addressing female-related issues of child marriage, alcoholism, domestic abuse, etc. By not taking
cognizance of women-centric issues, these leaders failed to further the cause of their community
at large. They could not sustain their struggle for long as they focused only on instant political
gains through electoral politics and not on reforming their community from within.
Pasmandaa Women
What is rather piquing is the fact that nowhere one finds the mention of Muslim Dalit
women (hereafter Pasmandaa women). So conspicuous is their silence that one is forced to ponder
as to why there is no documented work available in the corpus of extant literature either on Dalit
women or on Muslim women that would help provide a glimpse of the lived experiences of these
women. Pasmandaa women are situated at the intersections of multiple disadvantageous axes—
for instance, they are women, Muslims, and lower caste. And usually, they happen to be from the
poorest sections of the society. Their voices remain unheard while their
existence,unacknowledged.
Unaccounted Absences
It is now a well-acknowledged fact that the representation of Dalit women by non-Dalit
women fails to capture their lived realities. Often these non-Dalit, upper-middle-class, English
educated, urbanized women fail to factor in the caste-based oppressions of the Dalit women by
both upper caste men and women in feminist epistemologies. Owing to such grave elision by nonDalit feminists, Dalit women strongly objected to their “guest appearance” 6 by non-Dalit women
in their texts and speeches that barely depict the differential experience of the multiply oppressed
women (Guru 1995: 2549) in totality. The category of Dalit too is not monolithic, nor is that of the
category of Muslim. Both have their respective shares of internal fissures that become distinct by
the intersecting axes and, a very good example of this is the category ‘Dalit-Muslims’/MuslimSC= Scheduled Castes
ST= Scheduled Tribes
OBC=Other Backward Class/Castes
6
For more on the concept of “guest appearance” see Gopal Guru (1995)
5
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Dalits (Pasmandaas) and even within it we have Dalit-Muslim-women or women who are Muslim
but more Dalit.
The marginalization of these women is informed by the fact that there are several axes of
discrimination (gender, caste, religion, community) that work simultaneously towards the systemic
erasure of their existence as the most disempowered group, abandoned by their sororal subaltern
groups (here Dalit-women and Muslim-women who all happen to be victims of discrimination,
albeit of different kinds). Even as the corpus of Dalit literature grows, and discourses on Dalit lives
make their way through distinct centres for Dalit Studies in most universities of India, the
invisibility of these multiply marginalized women and men in the university curriculum is
glaringly obvious. Even in the Gender/Women's Studies Centres, established now in most
universities across India, which of course is the result of the concerted efforts of feminist activists
and academicians in mainstreaming feminist studies, women of this community are conspicuous
by their relative absence. Who will write for these women, and who will represent them? When
will these women have their writers who would narrate the innumerable unaccounted stories of
their lived experiences peppered with the instances of both oppression and resilience, exploitation,
and celebrations?
Methods
This article is based on the preliminary round of interviews of a larger study on Pasmandaa
women which is yet to be completed. The methodology was qualitative in approach and data was
collected using multi-sited participant observation, extensive, semi-structured interviews, and life
histories (Bernard 2006). Insofar as secondary sources on these women are concerned, I was
shockingly surprised that there was none—neither in fiction nor non-fiction academic scholarship.
This huge gap was the prime reason why I undertook this exploratory study on women of this
community. Participants were mostly from the adjoining states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar where
the movement for Dalit Muslims was conceptualized and spearheaded.
I interviewed women in the age cohort of 16-76 years old as it gave me a good
intergenerational range to understand their lived experiences over the years. The questions that
were addressed to them centered on their knowledge about the Pasmandaa movement, their
educational pursuits, their everyday practices, social interactions with other caste groups, and their
understanding of their intersectional identities as Pasmandaa women. The younger generation of
women from this community appeared to be more informed. They showed keen interest in
becoming a part of the mainstream through education and respectable jobs. They also expressed
their desire to be recognized formally as multiply disadvantaged, both within the larger Muslim
community (as Pasmandaa community) and within the Pasmandaa community itself (as
Pasmandaa women).
Indian Muslims have caste-like formations that are modeled, to a great extent, on the Varna
system. Such hierarchical social arrangement undergirded with discriminatory practices is against
the egalitarian spirit of Islam. Yet at the behavioral levels, caste-based discriminations are
perceptibly visible during marital alliances, commensality, localities, and even in social
interactions.
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Problematizing Pasmandaa Women: Challenges and Concerns
Pasmandaa women are situated at the intersections of multiple disadvantageous axes: they
are women, religious minorities, lower caste, lower class, and mostly illiterate. The intersecting
axes of religion, patriarchy, and caste complicate the problematization of these women, thus
blurring our understanding of their experiences. Even within their caste groups, women of this
community suffer gender-based discrimination. Overburdened by domestic chores and
exploitative, demeaning manual wage labor, they live a mechanized life.
In the absence of any secondary source such as autobiographical accounts, poetry, or even
folklore, it becomes difficult to have a deeper understanding of their lived experiences through the
decades. By contrast, this is not the case within the Dalit communities. They have been written
about as there are well-documented research works, along with other sources such as
autobiographical accounts by Dalit writers, poetry, etc. In addition to this, to facilitate research on
Dalits, the Indian state established several exclusive centres for studying Dalits and proactively
engaged in making Dalit lived experiences visible. Paradoxically neither the Gender Studies
Centres nor the Dalit Centres have ever even tried to take cognizance of Pasmandaa women.
Figure 1: Pasmandaa Women (PW) Depicted by the Intersecting Circles

Muslims

PW
Women

Dalits/oppressed

Pasmandaa Women: Narrating their Stories
What is it to be a low caste/Dalit Muslim woman? How does one understand the lived
experiences of these women whose community claims to be distinct from the rest of the Muslim
community? Even when compared to the Dalit Hindu women, there would be multiple points of
convergence and divergence between their experiences. Yet, the Dalit feminists failed to
acknowledge the need to study the distinctiveness of Muslim Dalit women and how they were
subjected to violence 'engendered by the organization of power around caste, religious
fundamentalism, economic exploitation, and the complicit state' (Kannabiran 2017: 4). Are then
the Indian mainstream feminists, Dalit feminists, and Muslim feminists collectively, by denying
these women representation, inflicting yet another kind of violence on them? By depriving them
of their right to document their stories of oppression, obfuscation, violence, religious
fundamentalism, backwardness, poverty, discrimination, Indian feminists’ core agenda of securing
social justice for the oppressed women fall flat vis-à-vis Pasmandaa women’s lived experiences.
Even when Dalit feminists vouched for using intersectionality as an apt tool to articulate
efficaciously the multiple vectors of oppression and discrimination that Dalit women were
subjected to, they did not even bother to recognize the vulnerabilities of these women in the face
of growing communalism post-Babri Masjid demolition. This was also the period when Mandal
commission agitation was at its peak. The repercussions of both these eventful moments in the
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history of post-colonial India on Muslims, Dalits, and women would have been different, but as
far as Pasmandaa women are concerned, these would have been more impactful as most of them
happen to be manual laborers, street vendors, sweepers, etc.
Vulnerability of Pasmandaa Women
According to an estimate, more than 85% of Muslims belong to the Backward Castes and
among them, almost half are women (Khawaja 2011). They belong to the occupational castes of
service providers such as washerman (Dhobi), tailor (Darzi), vegetable growers-cum-sellers
(Kunjre), butchers (Qasai), ironsmith and carpenter (lohar-bardhai), drum beaters (dholkiya),
bangle sellers (churdihara), drum makers (dholbaaz), etc. As in most Dalit households, both men
and women are involved in the processes of production/hard labor (Ilaiah 1999) so is the case with
women of this community. Since Dalit women happen to be part of the labor force (service
providers), it necessitates their mobility in highly masculinized public spaces. These masculine
spaces are 'guided by unwritten normative rules which restrict the entry of females and where the
presence of females is considered morally reprehensible' (Kazim 2018: 67). In such public space,
they are exposed to various kinds of oppressive practices ranging from derogatory remarks
slandering their caste affiliations to lewd comments with sexual overtones.
For instance, Rani, a 45-year-old vegetable seller, earlier assisted her late husband in their
home-based- rubber-flap making unit. But after his death, she failed to maintain the unit as it
required her to collect the raw material from the wholesale market which was in the vicinity of the
slaughterhouse. Women avoided going to such highly masculinized areas, marked with a pungent
smell of blood and filth and discomforting sight of semi-clad men working at the nearby tannery.
It was then that she decided to sell vegetables in the middle-class neighborhood where mostly
Ahraaf Muslims dwelt. With two teenage daughters and a nine-year-old son, life is not easy for
her. She barely earns to make ends meet. She used to send her daughters to the nearby
maktab/religious school, but after reaching puberty it is difficult for her to send them as in maktabs
only pre-pubescent girls are allowed. Also, the local cleric, who taught the girls earlier, wants them
to observe Purdah (veiling) as, according to his logic, they are vulnerable because of their gender,
hence it is best to guard their sexuality. In the absence of any male head and aware of the fact that
they hailed from a low caste group of kunjrde, the local cleric/maulvi behaved as their de facto
guardian. He once tried to lecture even Rani about how un-Islamic it was for her to frequent the
public space without properly veiling herself. According to him, Rubi and her daughters were a
potential source of Fitna or chaos and it was his religious duty to guide them of the sins of not
conforming to the norms of Purdah. To this absurd suggestion, she retorted rather sarcastically"Maulvi saab aap humara kharchaa chlaa dijiye, hum bhi aapki aurton kitareh aaram se ghar
baith jaayenge’. [Maulvi sir, if you provide for us then we too could stay at home just like women
of your family]. After that incident, the maulvi never pestered her again.
Rani wants to give formal education to her daughters. She wants them to be educated and
employed as a doctor and teacher—respectable jobs—but it is difficult for her to teach them in
good private schools with English as the medium of instruction. She, however, intends to teach
her son in English medium school and ensure that he gets schooled in relatively good private
schools. The decision of most lower-class parents to school sons in private English medium while
daughters in free public schools is informed by their financial limitations and the patriarchal
notions that are so deeply entrenched in the fabric of Indian society where sons are seen as assets
and as care providers in their old age. It is with such expectations that despite their financial
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constraints they want their sons to study in private English mediums schools as they are certain
that such education would readily translate into decent high salary jobs that would help them break
free from the drudgery of a poverty-ridden life. She also expressed her desire to get reservation
benefits for her son in educational institutions just like the Dalits/Scheduled Castes get. Being a
single mother with two teenage girls and no support whatsoever from her relatives who themselves
struggle to make ends meet, Rani constantly lives under uncertainty. On being asked whether she
was approached by any organization aimed at ameliorating the plight of Dalit Muslims, she
answered in the negative. There is no forum where they could voice their concerns. Since she is
the head of her family, it is she who represents her household. By that token, she should be allowed
to participate in any event that the leaders organize. But such events are conspicuous by the
absence of women. Each aspect of Rani’s identity contributes towards her multiply disadvantaged
position.
Sabina, 30 years old, is from the Lalbegi/Chamar/manual scavenger caste. She works as a
charwoman in the doctors' colony. She has been given assurance by one of these doctors that he
would try to make her a permanent staff in the hospital where he is posted himself. She further
remarked rather poignantly the fact that had she been a Hindu Scheduled Caste, by now, she should
be working in the hospital as permanent staff. But for Muslim Lalbegis, there is no such provision
of reservation. For the lure of a government job, she works hard and remains underpaid. The reason
why she chose to work for the doctors is that she lost her elder sister a few years back to childbirth.
She stated how her sister, due to a complex imbrication of religion and patriarchy, could not get
herself operated on for birth control. Tired of incessant pregnancies, she wanted to get sterilized,
aware of the fact that her husband would not ever agree to vasectomy. But she was not allowed to
do so as permanent birth control measures are proscribed in Islamic tradition. She ultimately died
delivering her tenth child. In contrast with this, in the case of any Hindu Dalit woman opting for
birth control measures could not be seen as a violation of religious norms. She wants to give good
education to her deceased sister's children and hence is trying to get a permanent government job
as a ward cleaner in this government hospital. These are some issues that the Pasmandaa men fail
to take cognizance of. Their focus is on first giving priority to the concerns of the male members
of their community. Issues of women rarely take precedence over those of men.
Conclusion
It is observed that Pasmandaa men, in their fight for getting official recognition as
Scheduled Caste by the Indian State, barely include their women as participants in this collective
struggle for claiming their rights to a political identity that discriminates on the grounds of their
religious identity. Owing to the multiply disadvantaged social positioning, these women also
happen to be the most backward as far as education and employability are concerned. Also, the
political discourses of mainstream feminists, Dalits, and Muslim activists reflect badly on their
agenda for liberation and social justice for the Pasmandaa women. Furthermore, any such
inhuman practice, prevalent within the Muslim community, by its very nature is antithetical to the
core principle of Islam. Thus, for them to speak, it becomes essential to create an environment that
enables them to do so. However, until then the Dalit feminists and the Islamic feminists need to
'Speak for them' (Spivak 1988). Even this would be sufficient to render visibility to the acutely
marginalized Pasmandaa women and help them recuperate their voices from the abyss.
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